


## **SECURITY DURING STRIKES**



# SECURITY DURING STRIKES

*By*

James W. Wensyel



CHARLES C THOMAS • PUBLISHER

*Springfield • Illinois • U.S.A.*

*Published and Distributed Throughout the World by*

CHARLES C THOMAS • PUBLISHER

2600 South First Street  
Springfield, Illinois 62717

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ISBN 0-398-05149-6 (cloth)

ISBN 0-398-06651-5 (paper)

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 85-8032

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**Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data**

Wensyel, James W.

Security during strikes.

Bibliography: p.

Includes index.

1. Strikes and lockouts. 2. Industry—Security  
measures. I. Title.

HD5306.W46 1985 658.4'73 85-8032

ISBN 0-398-05149-6.— ISBN 0-398-06651-5 (pbk.)

Printed in the United States of America  
SC-R-3

*James W. Wensyel directed law enforcement, investigative and industrial security programs for the U.S. Army for more than twenty years. He subsequently served as Director of Security for several international corporations and continues to work as a security consultant.*



*For three whose caring made so much  
possible: Catherine E. Shirk,  
godmother; Vera E. Wensyel, mother;  
Jean S. Wensyel, wife.*





## PREFACE

Many managers are reluctant to admit the existence of security problems—theft, fraud, embezzlement, misuse of company property—in their companies. Most, however, will readily admit concern for the damage a strike, whether of violent or non-violent character, can cause.

Most companies have no professionally trained Security Director. That function is an additional duty assigned to the Personnel Director, the Director of Industrial Relations, or to another manager. In many cases these individuals are not trained in general security matters, let alone in the specifics of security during a strike. Even professional Security Directors may not be experienced in these specifics.

Because responsible individuals are not fully aware of security aspects of strike management they do not realize defensive measures they might take before or during a strike to minimize its impact. The absence of planning and preparation thus leads to on-the-spot decisions and make-do operations that can aggravate inevitable confrontations and cause others.

This book develops concepts of security during strikes and provides sufficient operational details to make possible the establishment of effective security measures that will minimize strike damage. The information provided also may bring to administrators not normally associated with security matters a better understanding of a company's overall protection needs and the measures by which they can be established.

This book then may be of help to management generalists, to security specialists, and to internes in the administrative or security fields.

The author acknowledges with thanks the assistance of the Indiana State Chamber of Commerce in granting permission to quote from its excellent pamphlets "Employer's Labor Relations Guidebook" and "Management During Strikes," as cited in the text.



## INTRODUCTION

Most individuals responsible for directing corporate security and public safety programs have limited experience administering those programs during strikes. During the usual “quiet times” they often find themselves so busy with other projects (and security may be a “second hat” to those other responsibilities) that it’s easy to rationalize that they just don’t have time to prepare strike management plans or to rehearse their security staffs in those plans. Besides, it may never happen to their company anyway. If a strike does occur, however, they may find themselves with little time to prepare for it and limited knowledge of what to expect from it or how to handle problems it will present.

Even if they have had time to survey the usual security posture of their company, a strike situation is an entirely new ball game for them and for their staff. Routine Standing Operating Procedures no longer apply. Key individuals throughout the management staff will be absent or otherwise unable to perform their usual duties. Staff organizations will change. Emergency staffs and non-striking workers will work under pressures new to them, pressures that often will be very personal as old friends find themselves on opposite sides of a picket line.

The Security Director (or whoever is responsible for the corporate security and public safety programs) has a far better chance of meeting his peacekeeping responsibilities in this type situation if he has experienced a strike or been personally briefed on what to expect during one and how some problems might be avoided or, if encountered, best handled.

This text supplies that orientation. It cannot cover every situation that might arise because every strike creates its own happenings, but it focuses upon those areas and operations most affected by a strike and suggests means by which corporate security and public safety can be most easily maintained.

The Security Director or general manager should read it carefully and thoughtfully, applying its suggestions to his own corporate environment. He then should develop security aspects of a strike management plan for

his company. He should put those concepts in writing and orient his security staff on them. If he has done that and a strike is imminent, he and his staff will be ready for its challenge. And he can better assist overall management planning for the strike. If a strike comes without warning, he will at least know the directions he should move to do his part in maintaining or restoring order, in preventing or containing damage, in helping restore good feeling when the conflict is resolved.

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## **SECURITY DURING STRIKES**





## CHAPTER 1

### THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT

**F**or more than 200 years, Americans have been quick to defend their political freedoms. In two separate instances, for eight years between 1775–1783 and for four years between 1861–1865, they fought long and terrible national wars to determine the nature and direction of their political structure. Often friend was pitted against friend, brother against brother. Not surprisingly, during these same 200 years working men and women have been equally willing to contest their economic bosses. These economic bosses, as ruggedly individualistic as the workers, in turn defended what they considered to be their rights and the rights of the companies they governed.

The national wars brought death, destruction and great suffering to many thousands of people. But they determined the nature of our government, and our people remained politically free.

The conflict between manager and worker also has been long and violent—periods of uneasy calm shattered by sometimes prolonged fire fights of various weapons and tactics. It too brought a good-sized share of suffering. But it also won something: greater rewards to the individual worker—rewards he otherwise might not have had.

Labor itself has become a big and powerful business, capable of influencing the government and the nation's commerce to considerable degree. More than fifty unions maintain large national offices in Washington. Almost under the shadow of the Capitol, the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AF of L-CIO) union devoted \$4,000,000 to its national headquarters. Nearby, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters' building topped this by a \$1,000,000. And the Baker's and Confectionary Workers Union put \$6,000,000 of their union funds into their Washington office. From these centers, unions direct intense lobbying efforts against the Congress and various state legislatures. They greatly influence our national electoral processes. They invest millions of union dollars in building projects, health centers, banks, summer resorts. They are big; they are wealthy; they are powerful.

Periodically we read of union funds allegedly diverted into illegal or suspect activities or into the pockets of union representatives. Or a particular union or combination of unions will take an action that devastates an industry or area until the dispute is resolved or sputters out. Then leaders of industry, commerce, government—and many private citizens—will say that labor has gone too far, demanded too much, been given too much.

Or we will hear of thousands of workers laid off or fired by the closing of a local plant, with hoped for retirement benefits earned over many years' hard work wiped out by the snap of the padlock on the plant's gate. And we will wonder at the seeming callousness of "big business." Obviously, there are two sides to the coin.

The violence sparked by both sides over the years, and the use of unethical or illegal tactics to gain perceived ends, have lessened of late as federal and state legislation established formal ways to settle disputes and laws to regulate the combatants during them. But make no mistake, conflict between the opposing groups still simmers and will flare from time to time. The manager may get along well with his employees. They may be on a first-name basis and truly enjoy sharing the plant's annual softball game and ox roast. But let a grievance become a strike and the attitude of both sides usually hardens to, "There's them and there's us." It's always been that way. Perhaps combativeness is instinctive to Americans. The tradition began a long time ago.

In the Spring of 1786, journeyman printers throughout New York City united to demand a guaranteed \$1.00 minimum daily wage. Astounded employers immediately rejected the suggestion. The printers walked off their jobs. It was America's first organized labor strike. Except in those days it was called a "turnout." After several days of idle presses, the employers gave in. The "turnout" had been a success.

As the word spread, a series of "turnouts" occurred. Tailors, carpenters, weavers, coopers, gunsmiths, upholsterers, shoemakers. All "turned out" for better wages—sometimes with "tramping committees," the first picket lines.

Employers, for the most part, gave in. They raised the wages. Then they waited. When the workers' skimpy alliances dissolved, they took back their raises and the whole process had to begin again. Except the workers were slow to learn about sticking together. It would take awhile.

It had taken them quite awhile to come this far. The need for workers—not English dandies but honest to gosh workers—had been there from

the start. In 1609, Captain John Smith of Jamestown colony wrote his employers in England:

“When you send again . . . rather send but thirty carpenters, husbandmen, gardeners, fishermen, masons, and diggers of tree roots, well provided, than a thousand such as we have.”

Thousands risked the hazardous voyage and chancy future to come to America. Most were penniless. So they signed indentures, agreeing to serve the shipmaster (or a wealthy entrepreneur in England or in the Colonies) for five or more years. Others were convicted felons or refugees from debtors' prison, given the choice of jail or the Colonies.

In August, 1619 the Dutch ship “*Treasurer*” landed at Jamestown with a far more tragic ingredient to the labor mix—twenty strong negroes for sale as field hands. The Southern colonies were a little slow to adopt the idea. It was 1630 before a second ship, the “*Fortune*,” brought more slaves. These were sold for “85 barrels of rum and 5 bushels of tobacco.” This time the idea stuck. At a going price of only \$400 per slave, and the black slave's ability to adjust to the harsh life of a field hand, it seemed a good investment. By 1860 there would be more than 4,000,000 black slaves throughout the South. It took Eli Whitney's cotton gin to slow the flood of slave immigrants; the Civil War to stop it for good.

So for several reasons, and usually with little money, immigrants came to America. There was plenty of work for them—land to be cleared and planted, towns and connecting roads to be built, creature comforts left behind in the Old Country to be made and sold.

Craftsmen owned their own shops. They used apprentices, usually bound for terms of five or six years and with no pay except food, clothing and shelter provided by the master as they learned his trade.

After our Revolutionary War, trademen moved to the frontiers. A distribution problem developed. There was need for warehouses, transport and capital investment. Enter jobbers, distributors, middlemen, merchant capitalists. Craftsmen no longer were free agents. Their goods—spinning wheels, furniture, plows, shoes, long rifles, knives, spun cloth—were held in warehouses, then in country stores. Quality gave way to quantity. Craftsmen were pushed; they pushed their workers.

“Sunup to sundown” was a phrase workers of the period understood very well. A Philadelphia shoemaker complained:

“ . . . no matter how hard I work . . . I earn only eight and one-half dollars a week . . . and I am at the bench from five in the morning until sunset. . . . ”

As “push” turned to “shove,” animosity developed between the master craftsmen and journeymen. Journeymen (skilled tradesmen who had completed an apprenticeship program) formed mutual protection associations—forerunners of the union. The common laborer, however, was excluded. It would be years before organized labor included laborers.

In 1792, Philadelphia shoemakers formed a permanent union with written constitution, dues and elected officers. It probably was the first local trade union in the United States. In 1794, New York printers set up a similar union. By 1804 trade unions or “societies” existed in most fields. They kept membership lists and activities secret, however, as employers blacklisted known members. Strikes or “turnouts,” marked by great violence, followed. The term “scabs” was coined and much of the violence was aimed at those who worked while others struck.

Employers counterattacked in criminal courts. In March, 1806, eight Philadelphia shoemaker strikers were tried for “criminal conspiracy.” The jury found them guilty and thereby established that it was illegal for workers to unite in any “society, association, union or club” for increased wages or other benefits. Between 1806 and 1840 there were numerous strikes (tailors in Baltimore; shipscarpenters in Philadelphia; cabinet-makers in Boston; glaziers and painters in New York City). Maimings, beatings, shootings and death punctuated most of them. All the while, unions remained illegal associations whose members could be tried in criminal court. It was not until 1842, when the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that they were not “conspiracies” and therefore not illegal, that “union” members began to come out in the open.

Meanwhile, the factory system developed and with it more reason for labor dissent. “Merchant capitalists” could not meet the demands of an exploding society. With New England’s introduction of textile machinery came new production methods, a start at mass production. One man carded, another spun, a third wove, another pressed, and still another packed the product.

The new system increased production but aggravated labor-management conflict. And a new source of labor heaped fuel on the fire. Women and children joined the labor pool. Historians state that by 1820 more than half the factory workers in the United States were 9–10 years old. They worked an average of thirteen hours a day, six days a week, with about fifteen minutes for lunch. For all this, after the company deducted the cost of food and lodging in company dormitories, they earned between 33–67 cents per *week*. A nineteen year old girl described it: